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STATEMENT OF CASE 
This litigation has all arisen from a. contract for the 
sale and purchase of real estate, dated January 24, 1942, be-
tween the Western Reserve Underwriters Corporation, as 
seller, and plaintiffs, J. Lloyd Mathis and Nellie M. Burten-
shaw Mathis and C. E. Kingston, as trustee in trust for Davis 
County Cooperative Society. By the terms of the supplement 
to the Contract, (Exhibit A) the seller agreed to convey the 
property-four-fifths to Mathis and wife and one-fifth to C. E. 
Kingston as trustee. The purchase price of the property was 
paid and no controversy arose directly in connection with the 
purchase. When the full sum of the purchase price was paid, 
the seller was advised of a controversy and held up the deed. 
Immediately upon the execution of the contract, the pur-
chasers went into possession of the property. A memorandum 
of agreement for the operations on the farm was made as early 
as March of 1942. (See Plaintiffs' Exhibit R). No serious con-
troversy appears to have arisen as operations were conducted 
under this memorandum. It is apparent that the parties to 
the purchase of the property were not in controversy on the 
1st day of March, 1944, for on that day, an instrument en-
titled Farm Lease (Defendants' Exhibit 2) was entered into. 
]. Lloyd Mathis, Nellie M. Mathis and C. E. Kingston, as 
trustee in trust for Davis (ounty Co~op are designated as 
lessors. J. Lloyd Mathis, Nellie M. Mathis, C.· H. Owens, 
Delsa E. Owens, F. L. Hansen, Julia C. Hansen, C. E. King-
ston and Allen M. Frandsen, and LaMonda H. Frandsen, his 
wife, are designated as lessees. The land is described, and 
the lease is for a period of five years beginning March 1, 1944. 
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The consideration is n$1.00 and other lawful consideration, 
plus 50 per cent of profits of each year's ·earnings after all 
expenses, loans, etc., are paid." It is definite and certain that 
the lessees named took possession of the property at that time, 
for on the 24th day of ~lay, 1944, they executed and delivered 
to the Utah Farm Production Credit Association, a crop and 
chattel mortgage, upon crops grown upon the lands and in-
cluding a large amount of farm machinery, equipment and a 
large number of livestock to secure payment of the sum of 
$19,054.95. (See Defendants' Exhibit 9). 
On the 19th day of February, 1946, C. H. Owens and 
wife, F. L. Hansen and wife, and J. Lloyd Mathis and wife, 
executed and delivered to the State Bank of Lehi a crop and 
chattel mortgage covering crops grown upon the same land 
and also farm machinery, equipment, and livestock and in-
cluding 2500 bushels of wheat and 1500 bushels of barley 
stored in bins on the farm, to secure payment of a l?an of 
$8500.00. 
We call ·special attention to the farm lease and the two 
chattel mortgages· because it will appear hereafter that the 
controversies as between the plaintiffs and the Davis County 
Cooperaitve Society spring directly from the occupation and 
use of the premises during the period following the farm 
lease, (Exhibit 2) and indirectly involve the contract between 
the plaintiffs and the defendants Ferrells (Exhibit C). 
We leave for the time being the statement of the facts 
leading up to the controversy as between the plaintiffs and 
the Davis County Cooperative Society to take up the statement 
chronolo.gically of the facts out of which the controversy be-
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tween the plaintiffs and the defendants Madsens and the 
Ferrells arose. To complete the setting, this preliminary obser-
vation ·is important. 
About 1945, C. E. Kingston, who was then an officer 
of the Davis County Co-op, ent~red the employment of C. Ed 
Lewis, as a real estate salesman and while he was so em-
ployed, the land described in the original contract of pur-
chase by the plaintiffs and Kingston was listed for sale by 
the plaintiffs, J. Lloyd Mathis and Nellie M. Mathis and C. E. 
Kingston, and in connection with the listing of the property, 
Mathis agreed to pay a real estate commission of five per 
cent. After the listing, C. Ed. Lewis_ Company made a pre-
liminary Contract of Sale of the real estate· to J. A. Ferrell 
for the sum of $140,000.00 signed by J. L. Mathis and C. E. 
Kingston as sellers (Plaintiffs Exhibit F). 
On December 10, 1946, Ferrells paid $2,000.00 on ac-
count of the purchase of the property, (Plaintiffs' Exhibit W) 
and on the same day, Ferrell paid the sum of $12,000.00. 
The terms of sale were apparently modified and this prelimi-
nary contract was signed by J. A. Ferrell, Jay Ferrell, Almira 
Ferrell, J. Lloyd Mathis, Nelie M. Mathis and C. E. Kingston 
(Exhibit G) . 
On the 13th day of January, 1947, a formal agreen1ent was 
made between J. Lloyd Mathis and Nellie M. Mathis, as sellers, 
and J. A. Ferrell and Almira Ferrel, his wife, and Jay Ferrell, 
the son, for the sale of ·the land for $120,000.00, $30,-
000.00 of which was acknowledged as paid io the contract 
and installments of $7,500.00 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit C). It is 
made to appear from the record that all of the parties to the 
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contract knew of the interest of the Davis County Cooperative 
Society in the property, for there \Vas written into the contract 
the following provision: 
ttln the event there are any liens or encumbrances 
against said premises other than those herein provided 
for or referred to, or in the event any liens or en-
cumbrances other than herein provided for shall here-
after accrue against the same by acts or neglect of 
the Sellers, then the Buyers may at their option, pay 
and discharge the same and receive credit on the 
amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount 
of any such payment or payments and thereaft~r the 
payments herein provided to be made may, at t];le option 
of the Buyers, be suspended until such a time as such 
suspended payments shall equal any sums advanced as 
aforesaid.'' 
Ferrell paid the first installment of $7,500.00, making 
total payments of _$37,500.00 and all of the money went 
to Mathis. There is no claim that the Davis County Coopera-· 
tive Society received any part of this fund except possibly 
an advancement that had been made prior to that time in addi~ 
tion to the part payable by the Davis Countly Co-op. That was 
returned. The Davis County Cooperative demanded a divi-
sion of the money. Mathis refused to make it, and a sha(p 
controversy arose by reason of which Ferrell made no further 
payments except under the terms of the stipulation hereinafter 
referred to. 
On January 23, 1947, while the Ferrell negotiations were 
going on, and before the Ferrell contract was acknowledged 
and presumably delivered, February 15, 1947, a letter was 
addressed to C. Ed .. Lewis, acknowledged but not recorded 
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(Plaintiffs' Exhibit D). Th~ letter is so ambiguous and we 
think meaningless, that its contents cannot be adequately 
restated, and certainly we cannot state the legal effect. We, 
therefore, incorporat~ it in this statement of the case as 
follows: 
ttC. E. Lewis Company 
117 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
J. L. Mathis and Nellie M. Mathis, his wife; and 
C. E. Kingston and Et4el M. Kingston, his wife, for 
the Davis County Cooperative Society, Inc., own on an 
B07o-207o basis of Ranch at Lehi, Utah, formerly 
know11 as Saratoga or Austin Brothers Ranch; are in 
process of liquidation. 
When audit is complete final closing of sale of real 
estate, livestock, feed, and machinery is sold and 
allotment of funds from these; it is hereby agreed 
that in event there is not $ufficient funds to pay C. E. 
Kingston and Ethel M. Kingston for Davis County 
Cooperative Society, Inc., their equity, this property 
shall be transferred from Western Underwriters Cor-
poration to]. L. Mathis and Nellie M. Mathsi; secured 
by a mortgage at 37o per annum payable to C. E. King-
ston and Ethel M. Kingston for Davis County Co-
operative Society, Inc., out of all future funds derived 
as per sale except of interest due J. L. Mathis and 
Nellie M. Mathis until such an amount due C. E. 
Kingston and Ethel M. Kingston for Davis County 
Cooperative Society, Inc., has been paid in full, hereby 
waiv~ng all rights and interests in this property. 
Is/ C. E. Kingston 
Is/ Ethel M. Kingston 
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On this . twenty-third day of January, A. D. 1947 
·before me personally appeared C. E. l(ingston and 
Ethel M. Kingston, his wife who executed and signed 
the foregoing document. 
(Seal) . 
My Commission Expires; 
August 12, 1949. 
Is! Ardous Kingston 
Notary Public.'' 
There is no evidence in the case that C. E. Kingston and/ or 
Ethel ~I. Kingston, his wife, had any express authority what-
soever to sign this meaningless letter. It was claimed,· how-
ever, that they had implied authority to do so, and the court 
so found. We call attention again to the fact that at that 
time C. E. Kingtson was employed by Lewis. His interests 
were adverse to the interests of the Davis County Cooperative 
Society. There is no evidence to .the effect that either of the 
Ferrells or the defendant Madsen knew of this letter until 
after all transactions involving thei:n were closed. 
On the 15th day of June, 1948, the Davis County Co-op 
executed and delivered to' Alonzo F. Madsen and Leona F. 
Madsen, for a valuable consideration, a d_eed to an undivided 
one-fifth of the property jointly owned by the plaintiffs and 
the Davis County Co-op. The deed was regularly recorded 
· and Madsen took possession of one-fifth of the property, which 
under agreement, constituted 100 acres, and farmed it, taking . 
the crops for 1948, 1949, 1950 and 1951. The court has found 
that the letter (Exhibit D) operated as a transfer of the un-
divided one-fifth of the property· to Mathis and that the deed 
from the Davis County Co-op to Madsen ·was void. 
we now come to the stipulation referred to constantly in 
the record. The court will probably .conclude at this stage of 
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the transactions that the title of the property was involved. 
Ferrell had no means of making certain that he could ever 
acquire the full ownership of the property or . even that he 
could reap· where he had sown. Something had to be done. 
Accordingly, all of the parties interested in the property 
joined in a stipulation, (Plaintiffs' Exhibit B) under the 
terms of which Ferrell was authorized to sell the property, 
and out of theproceeds of the sale, to pay to Mathis the sum 
of $56,000.00 and to deposit in escrow the balance of what 
was determined to be the full purchase price payable by Ferrell 
amounting to $37,500.00, which with interest, was subse-
quently determined to be $39,300.00, in the Clearfield State 
Bank, Clearfield, Utah, in the joint names of Dan T. Moyle 
and J. D. Skeen, as attorneys of record in this case. The 
money is now there on deposit. 
In order to clear the title to the property so that it might 
be sold, it became and was necessary for Ferrell to procure a 
deed from Madsen and wife to the undivided one-fifth as 
well as quit claim deeds from other parties to the litigation. 
He accordingly agreed to pay M~dsen one-fifth of the selling 
price of the property (See Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12). At this 
point, we desire to add that the matter of the Davis County· 
Cooperative Society's interest was discussed in correspondence 
between Ferrell and Moyle and Moyle, ·attorneys for Mathis. 
Ferrells insisted upon the title being cleared because they 
knew it was not all in the plaintiff, who had signed the con-
tract before they made payment of the $30,000.00. In order 
to satisfy them, on the 25th day of January, 1947, Moyle 
and Moyle wrote Ferrell with respect to the title and said: 
10 
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HI will personally see that a proper conveyance' is 
obtained before or at the time the payn1ent is n1ade.'' 
The Western Reserve Underwriters Corporation refused even 
after the stipulation was made to convey the· property to 
Mathis because it had agreed to convey to him four-fifths 
and to the Davis County Co-op, one-fifth. According! y, it 
executed. and delivered deeds-four-fifths to Mathis ~nd one-
fifth to the Davis County Co-op, which, with the Warranty 
Deed from the Davis County Co~op to Madsen, perfec~ed 
his title to ·the one-fifth. 
Other facts must necessarily be referred to i~ our argu-
ment. 
PENDING LITIGATION, PLEADINGS AND STATUS 
On June 30, 1949, Moyle and Moyle, appearing as attor-
neys for plaintiffs, filed suit in t~e . District Court for Salt 
Lake County· against the Davis County Cooperative Society, 
Charles W. Kingston, as administrator of the Estate of Charles 
S. Kingston, deceased, Charles H. Owens, Francis M~ Hansen 
and Allen Frandsen, as defendants, alleging fraud and pr~ying 
for an accounting, $50,000.00 general datJ?.ages and $10,000.00 
punitive or exemplary damages. That suit is at issue, pre-trial 
has ~een had, and specifications of particulars wherein it · is 
clairp.ed fraud was perpetrated by the Davis County Cooperative 
Society has been filed. It is referred to at length in the tran- .. 
script of the testimony, pages 63 to 72, to which reference 
will hereinafter be made in ·detail. While the Salt Lake suit 
. . 
was thus pending .and undisposed of, and while the Ferrell 
11 
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contract was in full force and effect, upon which the plaintiffs 
had received for their own use and benefit to the exclusion 
of the Davis County Co-op $3 7,500.00, plaintiffs filed this 
case in the District Court for Utah County, Dan T. Moyle 
of the firm of Moyle and Moyle appearing as attorney fqr 
the plaintiffs, praying for judgment quieting title to the real 
estate in the plaintiffs. 
The defendants all filed Answers, Counter-Claims and 
Cross-Complaints. The issues thus framed were therefore 
limited to the question of the ownership of the land.· It was 
in that situation that the Stipulation, appearing on page 75 
of the record, was entered into, a pre-trial was had, and the 
court made an order sta~ing the issues appearing in the record 
on page 84. The contract of purchase of the ranch was of-
fered and received in evidence as Exhibit A with the supple-
mental agreement providing for the conveyance to Davis County 
Co-op of an undivided one-fifth and to the plaintiffs, an un-
divided four~fifths~ It was agreed that the seller, Western 
Reserve Underwriters Corporation, had been paid in full. 
The stipulation was received in evidence, the depositing of 
money. in escrow was admitted. The Western Reserve Under-
writers Corporation conveyed the property - four-fifths to 
·plaintiffs apd one-fifth to Davis County Cooperative Society 
and the deeds were recorded. It was stipulated that after the 
contract of purchase of the property was made, it was operated 
under . some arrangement. between the plaintiffs, C. E. King-
ston and Ethel M. Kingston. The letter addressed to E. Ed. 
Lewis (Exhibit D) was received in evidence subject to proof 
of authority to execute it and subject to its interpretation. The 
12 
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deeds to Madsen and wife were admitted, and it was admitted 
that Madsen and Ferrell were brothers-in-law and that Madsen 
attended an i~rigation meeting, and further, that the total sum 
of $39,300.00 \vas deposited in escrow. The following issues 
\\·ere reserved for submission to the court: 
PRE-TRIAL ISSUES OF FACT 
( 1) The arrangement under which the plaintiffs and C. E. 
Kingston and Ethel M. Kingston operated the farm prior· to 
January 23, 1947. 
( 2) The authority of C. E. Kingston for such operation 
and the execution of plaintiffs' Exhibit. D. 
(3) As to whether ·there was an estoppel which would 
operate as confirmation of the authority of Kingston. 
( 4) On what date, plaintiffs r.eceived actual notice of the 
execution and delivery of the deed (Exhibit 4) . 
( 5) As to the actual knowle4ge of Madsen and wife of 
Exhibit D. 
( 6) As to whether there was a conspiracy between Mad-
sens and Ferrells to defeat plaintiffs' rights. 
(7) If Ferrells were entitled t9 specific performance ·of 
Exhibit C and plaintiffs· are unable to convey one-fifth of the 
property, what damages would be sustained by Ferrells? 
(8) Was the deed from Davis County Co-op to Madsens 
fraudulently executed? 
13 
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(9) Did plaintiffs have knowledge of, or give their con-
sent to the assertion by the Madsens of a claim of title by 
Madsens of one-fifth of the property? 
( 10) Did Ferrels purchase Madsens' interest of one-
fifth of the property, and if so, upon what terms? 
( 11) Did Ferrells, after the assertion of claim by Madsen, 
permit defendants to use 100 acres of the land during 1948, 
1949, 1950 and 1951, and if so, the value of the use. 
Questions of law were reserved as to the effect of plain-
tiffs' Exhibit D. 
( 1) As to notice to Madsens· of Exhibit D or knowledge 
of facts sufficient to put them on notice. 
(2) If there was conspiracy between Madsens and Fer· 
rells, the effect of it upon any claims for damages asserted by 
defendant Ferrell. 
( 3) If it were determined that the defendants Madsen 
acquired good title to the one-fifth interest did defendants 
Ferrell waive any right to strict performance by plaintiff of 
Exhibit C. 
( 4) Are defendants Ferrell entitled to the specific per-
formance of Exhibit C, and are they entitled to damages for . 
loss of use of one-fifth interest? 
( 5) Did plaintiffs have legal right to make contract of 
sale to Ferrell (Exhibit C) ? 
( 6) What is the basis upon _which the escrow money 
should be paid? 
14 
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( 7) If F errells purchased the one-fifth from Madsen, 
were they justified in so doing? 
( 8) If they are entitled to reimbursement for the cost. 
of one-fifth, are they entitled to offset such amount against 
the sale to Mathis ? 
( 9) Assuming that in order to relieve the claim of de-
fendants Madsen to title and possession of one-fifth of the 
property, were Ferrells justified~ as· a matter of law, in permit-
ting Madsen to use 100 acres of the land? 
( 10) The interest of the parties in the money placed in 
escrow in the Clearfield State Bank. 
STATEMENT OF FINDINGS 
1. The court found (Finding No. 5) that after the execu-
tion of the cont!act of purchase of the property, the plaintiff · 
( (turned full management of all of the property covered there-
by over to C. E. Kingston, as trustee in trust, and that the 
said C. E. Kingston, together with other members of the 
Society, were in possession of the property until proceedings 
for the sale of the property and liquidation of the same, and 
the settlement of the accounts and advance between plaintiff 
and the Society were had in the latter part of 1946, or the 
forepart of 1947." Defendants except to that finding and 
assert that it is contrary to all of the evidence, written and 
documentary. 
2. The court found (Finding No. 7) the stgntng and 
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delivery to C. Ed Lewis, a real estate agent, of the letter, Ex-
hibit D. 
3. The court found (Finding No. 8) that C. E. King-
ston c•did considerable work for Lewis and that Exhibit D 
was executed in the office of C. Ed. Lewis after the plaintiff, 
J. Lloyd Mathis, had dictated its terms by telephone to the 
said C. E. Kingston himself and that such instrument was 
signed and acknowledged upon its date. 
4. The court finds (Finding No. 10) that the interest of 
the Davis County Co-op in and to the real property covered 
by the contract (Exhibit 8) was by Exhibit D .. transferred 
and conveyed to the plaintiffs upon the conditions subsequent 
.that any balance that might be found to be due to the Davis 
County Cooperative Society, upon completion of the audit 
of the transactions by the plaintiffs and the Society and the 
said C. E. Kingston be secured by mortgage payable to C. E. 
I<:ingston and Ethel M. Kingston, his wife, for said Davis 
County Cooperative Society, with interest at 3 per cent." 
5. The court found (Finding No. 10) that ((such condition 
subsequent has not as yet matured and the audit showing 
some disputable items is now before the Third District Court 
of Salt Lake County for determination." The court found that 
said Exhibit D and the execution thereof by the said C. E. 
Kingston was duly and legally, although not expressly by 
formal action, authorized by the Board of Directors of Davis 
Coupty Cooperative Society, and by the members thereof. 
6. The court found. (Finding No. 13) (Tr. 159) that 
C. E. Kingston, together with other members of the Davis 
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County· Cooperative Society, \Vere in possession of the prop-
erty from the date of the said Exhibit A and until the pro-
ceedings of sale and liquidation at the approxin1ate time of 
Exhibit D, and that during all of this time, the entire Board 
of the Society \vere fully· advised of the plans, conditions and 
proceedings upon and in connection with the property, and 
frequently affirmed ~d reaffirmed the powers of the said 
C. E. Kingston to act for the Society in connection with the 
property and that such powers were never terminated or 
modified and that after the execution· of said Exhibit D, a copy 
of the sam~ was a part of the files of the said Society and that 
all of the acts of C. E. Kingston in the purchase and manage-
ment of the property were fully approved by the Board and 
by the membership of the Society and that said Exhibit D 
was considered by such Board anq members to be a transfer 
of the interest of the So~iety to plaintiff, and it was so acted 
· upon by them." 
7. The court found (Finding No. 14·, Tr. 160) that 
Ferrells went into possession of the p.roperty and operated it 
during the year 1947, and no demand·was _made upon them 
until June of 1948. The court found (Finding No. 15) that 
the Davis County Cooperative Society ratified and affirmed 
and approved the acts of Kingston in connection with Exhibit 
D and is estopped ·from denying C. ·E. Kingston had proper 
.authority to execute the same. 
8. The court found (Finding No. 17) that Madsen had 
· actual notice of Exhibit D or knowledge that would put a 
prudent man upon inquiry, that he was a brother-in-law of 
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]. A. Ferrell and that Madsen was not a purchaser for value 
without notice. 
9. The court found (Finding No. 20) that Ferrells had 
actual notice of the existence of Exhibit D and that they were 
not justified in. giving possession of 100 acres of land to 
Madsen. 
10. The court found that there had been deposited in 
the Clearfield State Bank $39,300.00 pursuant to stipulation. 
11. Lastly, the court found (Finding No. 23~) that with 
respect to the issue raised as to the sort of arrangement under 
which plaintiffs and C. E. Kingston and Ethel M. Kingston, 
his wife, operate the property prior to January 23, 1947, is 
more properly determined and should be determined in the 
said accounting action pending in the Third District Court. 
STATEMENT OF CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
_ As Conclusions of Law, the court drew the following: 
1. That Exhibit D transferred all of the interest of the 
Davis County Co-op in and to the ranch to the plaintiffs 
(Tr. 163). 
2. That the plaintiffs were the owners of all of the e.quity 
and interest in the contract to purchase from the Western Re-
serve Underwriters and had the full right and authority to 
. execute and deliver the contract, Exhibit C, to Ferrell. 
3. That plaintiffs are entitled to all of the consideration 
for the sale of the property to the defendants, J. A. Ferrell, 
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Almira Ferrell and Jay Ferrell, under Exhibit A, (Tr. 164) 
including the amounts already received by them and the money 
on deposit in the Clearfield State Bank in the names of J. D. 
Skeen and Dan T. Moyle, to-wit: $39,300.00, with all interest 
thereon, subject however to the right of the defendant, Davis 
County Cooperative Society to receive from such. escrow funds 
such proportion thereof as may be necessary to con1pensate it · 
for its interest in the property as of January 23, 1947. That 
may be determined by the District Court for Salt Lake County . 
. 4. That Madsen did not acquire any interest or title in 
or to the property involved as against the plaintiffs (Tr. 164). 
5. That neither the defendants, Ferrells, nor Madsens 
nor any other defendants, with the exception of Davis County 
Cooperative ·Society, have any claim of any part of the fund, 
and lastly, that there should. be expressly reserved from this 
case the interpretation of Exhibits R, E and 2. 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit E is a memorandum of an . agreement 
as to expenses and receipts from operation of the farm by 
C. H. Owens. 
STATEMENT OF DECREE 
The Decree adjudges the $39,300.00 in escrow tn the 
Clearfield State Bank in the joint names of J. D. Skeen and 
Dan T. Moyle to be the money of the plaintiffs,subject to the 
right of the· defendant, Davis County Cooperative Society, 
o_f sufficient of such funds to compensate it for its interest 
in the property as of January 23, 1947; and adjudges further. 
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that the Davis County Cooperative Society be denied any af-
firmative relief and expressly reserving the interpretation of 
Exhibits R. E and 2 as to their barring upon the relationship 
betv1een the plaintiffs and the defendants, C. E. Kingston 
and Davis County Cooperative Society, in the farming and 
other operations of the property. 
POINTS UPON WHICH THE APPELLANTS 
EXPECT TO RELY 
I. Plaintiffs' Exhibit D, being a communication addressed 
'to C. Ed. Lewis Company and signed by C. E. Kingston and 
Ethel M. Kingston is void because: 
(a) It was signed, delivered and acknowledged without 
authority from the Davis County Cooperative Society. 
(b) C. E. Kingston was the agent of C. Ed. Lewis Com-
pany, who in turn was the agent of the plaintiffs, while at 
the same time the said Kingston was the trustee for the Davis 
County Cooperative Society and was therefore adversely in-
terested and no implied authority can be imputed to him. 
(c) The Board of Governors of the Davis County Co-
operative Society considered a proposal by C. E. Kingston 
respecting the sale of said property to Ferrell during the 
negotiations for the sale of said property but failed to authorize 
the said C. E. ~ingston to. sell said property, and implied 
authority of the said C. E. Kingston, if any, to a\t for said 
corporation cannot be found. 
(d) Said instrument was at most but an offer and if com-
municated to plaintiffs, · was not accepted. 
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(e) Exhibit D is void under the Statute of Frauds, be-
cause it purports to impose upon the plaintiffs an obligation 
to pay to· the Davis County Cooperative Society 20 per cent 
of the proceeds of the sale of said property, and to give the 
said Davis County Cooperative Society a mortgage to secure 
payment of said sum and said instrument was not signed by the 
parties to be bound thereby, as required by Utah ,Code 3 3-5-1, 3. 
(f) Exhibit D is unintelligible, incomplete, uncertain ·and 
ambiguous to the extent that it cannot be intelligently con-
strued or enforced and it without equity. 
II. The court wholly misinterpreted and misconstrued 
Exhibit D in this that the cour~ takes cchereby waiving all 
rights_ and interest in this property'' out of the context and 
construes it to mean an absolute, unconditional transfer of 
an undivided one-:fifth of the said land contrary to and in 
express disregard of the context thereby making it mean that 
the property was transferred by the voluntary act of C. E. 
Kingston while acting in a dual capacity for adverse interests 
without ·consideration. 
III. There is no pro~£ of knowledge of the defendant 
. Madsen of the existence of Exhibit D when he took title to 
one-fifth of the property. 
--~ IV. There is no evidence that the Ferrells had any knowl-
edge of Exhibit D until after they had purchased the property . 
in reliance upon paragraph No. 9 of their contract, Exhibit C, 
and the Moyle letter, Exhibit 8. 
V. The court failed to construe or t~ give effect to con-
tracts for the operation of the ranch, Exhibits R, E and 2. 
21 
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I 
VI. Exhibit D was not a transfer of the interests of the 
Davis County Cooperative Society in the lands covered by 
the Contract, Exhibit A. 
VII. The plaintiffs refused to pay to the Davis County 
Cooperative Society one-fifth of the proceeds of the sale of 
said property to Ferrell and thereby rejected the binding effect, 
if any, of Exhibit D. 
VIII. The trial of this case was abortive and incomplete 
and inconclusive in that while the court based its judgment 
upon the possession by the Davis County Co-op of the Saratoga 
Ranch, it refused to consider the instruments which show con-
clusively that the legal and actual possession of the property 
was in the plaintiff and . other individuals, not including the 
Davis County Co-op. 
IX. The decree made and given in. the above-entitled 
cause is not supported by the findings or conclusions or the 
record, is unjust and contrary to law and equity, and the judg-
ment must be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT D, BEING A COMMUNICA-
TION ADDRESSED TO C. ED. LEWIS AND SIGNED 
BY· C. E. KINGSTON AND ·ETHEL M. KINGSTON IS 
VOID BECAUSE: 
22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(A) 
IT WAS .SIGNED, DELIVERED AND ACKNOWL· 
EDGED WITHOUT AUTHORiTY FROM THE DAVIS 
COUNTY COOPERATIVE SOCIETY. 
The court does not find, in the written opinion or in the 
findings, that direct authority was ever given by the Board of 
~1anagers of the defendant, Davis County Cooperative Society, 
to C. E. Kingston to sell the undivided one-fifth of the Sara-
. toga Ranch at any time or for any price. The' minutes of the 
Board, Exhibit V, negative any claim of such authority. 
(B) 
C. E. KINGSTON WAS THE AGENT OF C. ED. 
LEWIS COMPANY, WHO WAS IN TURN. THE AGENT 
OF THE PLAINTIFFS, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME, 
THE SAID KINGSTON WAS THE TRUSTEE OF THE 
DAVIS COUNTY COOPERATIVE SOCIETY AND WAS 
THEREFORE ADVERSELY INTERESTED AND NO IM-
PLIED AUTHORITY COULD BE IMPUTED TO HIM . 
. Kingston was dead at the time_ of the trial of the case 
and hence his reason for_ signing ~xhibit D could not be dis-·. . 
closed to the court however, his acts were readily under-
standable. He was employed by Lewis as a real estate sales- . 
man (Tr. 198) and the court so found. Lewis was a real estate 
broker and had this land listed with him for sale on a real 
estate dealer's commission (See Plaintiffs' Exhibits F, W and 
G). We assume the. employment was on a commission basis; 
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however, in any event, it was Kingston's duty to Lewis to 
make the sale or to participate in the consummation of it. In 
either event, his relations to Lewis and to the Davis County 
Co-Op were adverse, and being so adverse, there_ could be 
no implied authority to act for the corporation. 
Elggren et al vs. Woolley, 64 Utah 183. 
In this case, quoting from Thompson on Corporations, 
the Court said: 
((In all contracts they make they repr~sent the stock-
holders and not themselves; and in all their official 
actions they are to consider, not their private interests, 
but that of the stockholders, whose property they man-
age and control. This rule is so strict and so rigidly_ 
enforced that the law will not permit. these officials 
to subject themselves to any temptations to serve their 
own interest in preference to the interest of the stock-
holders." 
In Kahn vs. Perry Zolezzi, Inc., 226 Pac. 2nd 118, Judge 
Dunford, speaking for this court said: 
c_clt. is against public policy for officers of a corpora-
tion to deal with others in relation to corporate busi-
ness for their own separate advantage and the law 
affords no sanction whatever for such acts." 
Citing Elggren vs. Woolley. 
And see the recent case of 
I<nox et al v. First Security Bank of Utah, eta al, 
196 Fed. 2nd 112, 
wher_e the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, 
Bratton, Circuit Judge, speaking for the court said: 
c_<A. C. _Milner was interested in having that obliga-
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tio~ on his part discharged by the Milner Corporation 
adopting the contract of March 16, 1909. His interests 
were adverse to the Milner Corporation, and that be-
ing so, he could not bind the corporation· under his 
general authority as president. See Fletcher Corpora-
tions, Permanent Ed., Vol. 3, Section 922 et seq.; Kahn 
v. Perry Zolezzi, Utah 226 P. 2d 118, 123; Elggren 
vs. Woolley, 64 Utah 183, 228 P. 906." 
The adverse interest having been shown by the plaintiffs . 
in this case, we conclude, under these authorities, that there 
could be n~ implied authority on the part of Kingston to sign 
Exhibit D. 
(C) 
THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE DAVIS 
COUNTY. COOPERATIVE SOCIETY CONSIDERED A 
-,.. 
PROPOSAL BY C. E. KINGSTON RESPECTING THE 
SALE OF SAID PROPERTY TO FERRELL DURING THE 
NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE SALE OF SAID PROPERTY 
BUT FAILED TO AUTHORIZE THE SAID C. E. KING-
STON TO SELL SAID PROPERTY, AND IMPLIED AU-
THORITY OF THE SAID C. E. KINGSTON, IF ANY, TO 
ACT FOR SAID CORPORATiON CANNOT BE FOUND. 
We call attention to the minutes of the Board of Governors 
held on November 24, 1946, wherein the matter of selling the 
farm was reported by C-. E. Kingston and discussed by the 
individual members. C. E. Kingston was not only not author-
ized to make the sale but the expression of individual members 
were against a sale. The price at which Kingston said he had 
a chance to sell the property was $140,000.00, not $120,000.00, 
... 
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for which the place was sold. ·~gain, at the meeting of De-· 
cember 22, 1946, Owen reported that Ferrell had said he 
was going to buy the· property. Again, rio authority \vas given 
l(ingston to make the sale. 
Exhibit D is dated January 23,, 1947, and no meeting 
was held at which any auth?rity was given between .that date 
and the date of signing the Exhibit on January 23, 1947. 
It is significatft that at these meetings, there appears to 
be no controversy whatsoever between Mathis and the Co-op· 
and certainly there was no thought on the part of the Gov-
ernit?-g Board that Mathis claimed he had been defrauded 
or even that there was any indebtedness due from the Co-Op 
to him. On the contrary, it' appears that the Co-Op had faith-
fully complied with its agreement and was able to pay the 
balance of. the purchase price of the property without assist-
ane from Mathis. These minutes, we contend, negative any 
inte~tion on the part of the Co-Op to permit C. ~· Kingston 
to sell the property without action on the part of the Co-Op 
· .itself. 
(D) 
EXHIBIT ·D CONSTITUTED AN UNACCEPTED 
OFFER, DID NOT BECOME A CONTRACT AND IS NOT 
SUBJECT TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 
This exhibit is a letter addressed to . Ed. Lewis, not to 
the plaintiffs. It did not purport to be a contract of sale of 
the interest of the Davis County Co-Op in the ranch. It im-
posed obligations upon Mathis and necessitated his accept-
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ance ~ \Yriting which \vas not given. Notwithstanding the last 
clause, it did not operate as a sale of the interest of the 
Co-Op in the property. The conduct of Mathis shows conclu-
sively that he did not intend to be bound by it, for it provides, 
if it can be -construed at all,. for the payment of all of the pro-
ceeds of the sale of the property to the Co-Op until its claims 
to an undivided one-fifth was elin1inated. That, Mathis refused 
to comply with. Furthermore, it provides for the giving by 
Mathis of a mortgage to secure payment to the Co-Op of any 
balance due it and the mortgage presumably was to cover 
the very property that was being sold by Mathis. There is 
nothing in the contract of sale to Ferrells that authorized the 
giving of such a mortgage. Attention has been called to the 
fact that nowhere in the dealings between the Co-Op and 
Mathis was. there any indication of an indebtedness from the 
Co-Op to Mathis. On the contrary, the evidence shows. there 
was none. Had Mathis signed· the instrument, the court coilld 
and should have impounded the money or directed the pay-
ment of it to the Co-Op, provided Exhibit D constituted such 
an instrument as could be specifically enforced, but Mathis 
did not elect to be bound by it and it did not become a contract. 
(E) 
EXHIBIT D IS VOID UNDER THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS, UTAH CODE 33-5-1, 33-5-3. 
This statute reads: 
((No ·estate or interest in real property, other than 
leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust 
or power ·over or concerning real property or in any 
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n:anner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, as-
stgned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act 
or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writ-
~ng subscribed. by the party creating, granting, assign-
tng, surrendenng or declaring the sa1ne, or by his la\v-
ful agent thereunto authorized by' writing." 
33-5-3 
C!Every contract for the leasing for. a longer period 
than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any 
interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, 
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing 
subscribed by the party by ·whom the lease or sale 
is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto author-
ized in writing." 
. Exhibit D imposes the distinct obligation upon Mathis to. give 
a mortgage for an unknown amount upon property which 
must be read into the contract and which will attach to all 
future funds derived from the sale of the property until the 
unknown amount is paid to the Davis County Co-Op. There is 
no controversy respecting these propositions. 
Construed. in Adams vs. Manning, 46 Utah 82 
The Supreme Court of the U~ited States said, in the. very ol~ 
case of 
Hughe·s c. Moore, 3 L. Ed. U.S.R., at page 312, 
((The court can perceive of no distinction between 
the sale of land, to which a man has only an equitable 
title and a sale of land to which he has title. They 
are equally· within the statute." 
In 49 American Jurisprudence, Section 3 54, the law ts 
stated . as follows: 
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(]t is not sufficient that the note or n1emorandum 
express the terms of a contract; it is essential that it 
completely evidence the contract which the parties 
made by giving all of the essential terms. The writing 
must be such that all of the contract can be collected 
therefrom; resort cannot be had ·to the terms of the 
oral contract to supply defi.iciencies in the memorandum. 
A memorandum which refers to an essential term of 
the contract t:ts one to be agreed on subsequently does 
not meet the requiren1ents of the statute. A contract 
in writing which leaves some essential term thereof to 
be shown by parol is only a parol ·contract, and is, 
therefore, not enforceable under the statute of frauds. · 
Thus, a written contract for the sale of land or an in-
terest therein must coyer the entire contract in order 
to satisfy -the statute." 
It is amply supported by the cases cited. 
In Williams v~ Morris, 95 U. S. 444, 24 L. Ed., 360, the 
court said: 
((Unless the essential terms of the _sale can be as-
certained from the writing itself,· or by reference in it 
to something else, the writing is not a compliance 
with the statute; and, if the agreement be thus defec-
-tive, it ·cannot be supplied by parol proof, for that 
would at once introduce all the mischiefs which the 
statute was intended to prevent.'' 
And in Keystone Hardware Corp. vs. Tague, 158 NE 27, 53 
ALR 610, the Court of Appeals of New York said: 
((A written contract for purchase and sale of real 
estate which provides for mortgage to -expire on dates . 
to b~ subsequently agreed upon cannot be specifically 
enforced if the dates are never agreed upon or are 
agreed upon by parol." 
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·See also Dineen v. Sullivan, 23,1 Pac. 2nd 241, _where the rule 
above stated is repeated with quotations from numerous cases. 
The letter cannot therefore be treated as a contract for 
any purpose whatsoever because it does not purport to be. a 
binding contract. It is· vague and uncertain in the respects 
pointed out. It is not signed by the Western Underwriters Cor-
poration, which by its terms was to convey the legal title to 
the whole of the. property to Mathis contrary to its previous 
agreement,· and it is not signed by Mathis and his wife, who 
are parties to be bound by it in that they agreed to give King-
ston a mortgage · to secure his equity. The ex~ibit tnust ·be· 
wholly disregarded. 
(F) 
EXHIBIT D IS UNINTELLIGIBLE, INCOMPLETE, 
UNCERTAIN AND AMBIGUOUS TO THE EXTENT 
THAT IT CANNOT BE CONSTRUED OR SPECIFICALLY 
ENFORCED IN EQUITY. 
The plaintiffs, by their conduct, rejected the letter as a 
contract or an offer to contract, by taking and holding all of 
the money paid by Ferrell, and even after the stipulation was 
made, insisted upon the payment in full of their part and the 
depositing in e~crow of the part which properly belonged to 
the Co-Op or its successors in interest. No mortgage was 
tendered. There is no evidence that they participated in secur-
ing an audit if any audit was. necessary, but on the contrary, 
asserted spurious claims in order to create the color of right 
to. take and hold money on accounts which it had never claimed 
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to e~ist before Exhibit D '"as signed. It brought suit first against 
the Co-Op and various individuals and later, brought suit 
to quiet title to the property as hereinafter more fully set out, 
in disregard of its contractual obligations. It could scarcely 
have done more to make definite and certain its rejection of 
the offer if it can be construed as anything of a legal nature. 
For the many reasons stated, the letter does not come within 
the classes subject to specific performance. 
We cite 5th Pomeroy, Section 2188 
( (But parol evidence con never be given to supply 
an omitted item or make definite and certain that which 
the parties left indefinite and uncertain; in a word, 
parol evidence cannot show the intent of the parties if 
it cannot be found in the contract.'' 
Section 2189 
((The contract must be complete, definite and certain 
as to whatever conditions are annexed, terms of credit 
where given, place of performance, time of perform-
ance unless a reasonable time is inferred, and other 
terms that are made by the contract. Thus, a contract 
to· furnish a city with light, .allowing the ·substitution 
of electric light for gas, but leaving the number and 
price of the electric lights for later agreement is un-
enforceable for incompleteness in a material term." 
Exhibit D was not mutually enforceable when it was 
delivered to Lewis by Kingston, and there never became mu-
tuality in the remedy because the plaintiffs did not sign it or 
otherwise accept it as an offer, did not, by their pleading, offer 
to do equity, and the plaintiff Mathis, on the witness stand, 
positively refused to do equity by paying to the Co-Op its 
proportion of the proceeds of the sale of the property. It does 
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not therefore come within the rule that even though a contract 
lacks mutuality when executed, it may be specifically enforced 
if there is mutuality in the remedy. 
See monographic not to 
Vanzandt vs. Heilman, New Mexico, 22 ALR 2nd 
497, 508. 
After a very extended citation of cases, the rule is stated as 
follows: 
c CGiven a contract within the class \vhich a court of 
equity will compel to be specifically executed, and 
given the fact that the plaintiff's undertaking remains 
wholly or partly executory, the court will not entertain 
jurisdiction of the case unless its decree can be made 
to compel execution by both sides, and unless it is pre-
pared to retain jurisdiction of the case and oversight 
of performance until full execution is accomplished. 
The plaintiff must allege that he is ready, able, and 
willing to perform his undertaking as may be decreed 
by the court, and if on motion or otherwise it appears 
that he may not be financially able to do so when 
the decree is entered, it is within the discretion of 
the court to require such security against that event 
as the case may warrant, by payment of money into 
court or otherwise." · 
Exhibit D in no sense comes within this rule and furthermore 
the court did not even attempt to protect the Co-Op, but on 
the contrary went to an extreme limit in attempting to stay 
the hands of the District Court for Salt Lake County with a 
res judicata so that even it could not protect the defendant be-
cause of the finding of possession which we have heretofore 
criticized. 
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It cannot be claimed that the suit to quiet title to the 
land can be treated as a suit for specific performance and as 
an acceptance of an offer by Exhibit D, for the Co~Op with-
drew the offer before acceptance upon the refusal of Mathis 
. to pay in accordance with Exhibit D and to convey the prop-
erty to Madsen. 
POINT II 
THE COURT MISINTERPRETED AND MISCON-
STRUED EXHIBIT D. 
The exhibit plainly provides that an audit is to be made, 
that the funds are to go to C. E. Kingston for the Davis 
Co1,1nty Co-Op from the sale of various things, that the prop-
erty shall be transferred from Western Reserve Underwriters 
Corporation to J. L .. Mathis and Nelli~ Mathis, and that the 
Co-Op shall have all of the money derived from the sales ex-
cept interest and the balance due the Co-Op shall be secured 
by mortgage until the.Co-Op is paid in full. At that time, there 
was in existence a contract with the W esetrn Reserve Under-
writers Corporation under which it agreed to convey one-fifth 
of_the property to the Co~Op. It was of course not a party 
to Exhibit D and was in no way bound by it. When all these 
things were done, and the Co-Op had received its money, the 
last clause, {(hereby waiving all rights and interest in the 
property," could take effect. The instrument is not subject to 
any other interpretation. By the Findings, Conclusions and 
Decree in this case, the court has, in effect, stricken . out all 
parts of Exhibit D excepting only the last clause and has 
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attetnpted to tie the hands of the District Court for Salt Lake 
County with a res judicata while at the same time refusing 
to consider documents showing conclusively that the Co-Op 
was not and is not in any way indebted to the plaintiffs. 
We invite the court's attention· to the cross examination of 
Mathis with respect to Exhibit D, and the retention by him 
of all of the money received from the. sale of the property, 
and to his detailed specification of claims filed in the District 
Court for Salt Lake County. Mr. Mathis was asked (Tr. 61) 
"Q. In other words,_ Mr. Mathis, did you think by this 
letter, you got this property before the Co-op was 
paid up for its one-fifth interest? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You didn't? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. · And you don't claim now that you have this prop-
erty, do you ? 
A. No, sit. 
Q. No. You didn't claim that you owned this property 
when you made a contract to sell it to Ferrell, did 
you? 
A. Yes, sir, on the basis of that agreement." 
The court found to the contrary and upon the basis apparently 
of the finding that the Co-Op had been in ·ppssession of the 
property at all times without regard to Exhibits 2, R and E, 
which the court refused to consider, and upon the specifica-
tions of claims against the Co-Op set out in 3 3 different as-
signments in all and specifically referred to in. the record. Be-
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cause of the importance of this claim, \Ye are calling specific 
attention to these assignments (Tr. 62-specifically Tr. 68 
to 97). 
The 3 3 assignments are epitomized: 
1. Reasonable value of meats," poultry, eggs and produce 
raised or grown on said property and consumed by the de-
fendants during their occupancy of the same. 
2. Charges made by the defendants for repairs and main-
tenance. 
3. Charges and expenditures made by the defendants for 
gasoline and oil claimed to have been used by them for farm-
ing and other equipment. 
4. Charges and expenditures made by defendants for re-
pairs to equipment. 
5. Charges by defendant Owen for mowing hay. 
6. Charges made by Allen Frandsen for plowing in 1945. 
7. Charges made by defendant Hansen for . hauling 
cement. 
8. In accordance· with agreements between defendant's 
Owen, Hansen and Frandsen and C. E. Kingston, acting· for 
or on behalf of defendant, Davis County Co-Op, no charges 
for labor performed on the property by these defendants or 
their families was to be mad~ against the plaintiffs. In the 
items of labor charged by these defendants, an accounting 
should be made. 
9. The same with respect to thinning beets, etc. 
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10. During the years 1945 and 1946, defendants Owe~ 
and Frandsen, ~n behlf of defendant, Davis County Coopera-
tive Society, · without authorization by or consultation with 
plaintiffs, entered into contracts with certain Japanese for the 
planting, caring for and harvesting of celery and the advance-
ment of money to them. On this item, we call the court's at-
tention to the chattel and crop mortgage given by the plaintiffs 
and others to the State Bank of Lehi (Exhibit 1). The mort-
gage was signed by the plaintiffs and covered the celery re-
ferred to in specification 10. 
11. No. 11 is· confined entirely to Owen, Hansen and 
Frandsen. 
12. No. 12 is confinecl to Owen. 
13. No. 13 is for a credit for reasonable value of ma-
terials and crops :wasted and all?wed to ·spoil. 
14. No. 14 pertains to Owen .. 
15. No. 15 pertains to a hay bailer purchased by defendant 
Hansen. 
16. No. 16 pertains to fertilizer for celery and pertains 
to Owen. 
17. No. 17 pertains to Owen. 
18. No. 18 is for telephone bill and pertains to Owen. 
19. No. 19 pertains to Frandsen and is for ch~cks taken 
20. No. 20 pertains to flour used by Frandsen. 
21. ·No. 21 pertains to.·Owen, Hansen and Frandsen. 
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22. No. 22 pertains to tools alleged to have been on the 
place at the time of the purchase. 
No. 23 pertains to the cost of the cellar constructed for 
potatoes without plaintiffs' consent. 
24. No. 2-l pertains to charges made against Owen, Han-
sen and Frandsen. 
25. No. 25 pertains to charges made against Owen. 
26. No. 26 pertains to charges made against Hansen. 
27. No. 27 pertains to charges against Frandsen for re-
modeling granary. 
28. No. 28 pertains to Owen, to a loss of onion crop. 
29. No. 29 is a charge against Frandsen and the Co-Op 
for apparently excessive water used in 1945. 
30. No. 30 pertains to Frandsen and the Co-Op for the 
balance of $90.00 for pasture rental. 
31. No. 31 is against. Owen and Frandsen and the Co-Op 
for hay raised in 1945 .. 
32. No. 32 is against Owen, Hansen and Frandsen and 
the Co-Op for equipment taken by them from the property 
prior to auction sales. · 
3,3. No. 33 is against all of the defendants for $480.00 
for the cost of a temporary electric fence used on the property. 
The court will readily see that the charges are substan-
tially all baseq upon the Lease, Exhibit 2, . and are against in-
dividuals and not the Co-Op. Notwithstanding which, the 
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court, we again say, disregarded Exhibit 2 and in the face of 
the fact that the claims are not made against the Co-Op treats 
them as a payment to the Co-Op of the moneys due it for its 
one-fifth interest. The court goes further and makes the finding, 
draws the conclusion and enters the judgment calculated to 
. . 
bar a full hearing of the pending suit in Salt Lake County. 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO PROOF IN THE RECORD OF KNOWL~ 
EDGE ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT MADSEN 
OR OF THE DEFENDANT FERRELL OF EXHIBIT D AT 
THE TIME MADSEN PURCHASED THE ONE-FIFTH IN-
TEREST FROM THE DAVIS COUNTY CO-OP. 
The court finds that Madsen had knowledge of Exhibit 
D at the time he purchased the property. The finding is based 
upon two facts as we understand the record: 
1. That Madsen . attended an irrigation meeting prior to 
the time he purchased the one-fifth interest from the Co-Op, and 
2. That he is the brother-in-law of Ferrell and that Fer-
rell inust have known of the existence of Exhibit D and must 
have told Madsen. Madsen testified without contradiction that 
he had never ·seen the instrument until it was shown to him 
in the office of the writer of this brief in. the preparation of 
. the trial of the case in Provo. That evidence is not contradicted. 
While this finding is not supported by the evidence and 
is wholly unjustified. we pass it with hte suggestion that it 
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is wholly immaterial for the reasons whjch we have heretofore 
fully set out. No layman or lawyer can read Exhibit D and 
conclude that it creates a lien upon anything or operates as 
a transfer of anything. It was not known to eithet Madsen 
or Ferrell or to their attorney until some considerable time 
after Madsen had bought and paid for this property. We will 
not repeat all the reasons why the Co-Op was perfectly justi-
fied in selling the property to Madsen. It had permitted one 
season to go, no doubt hoping to get. a settlement with Mad-
sen, and it was called upon to act or lose its property. The 
title to Madsen is perfectly regular in all respects, is for a 
valuable consideration. There is _nothing in the record which 
discloses any adverse interest, and with the contract (Exhibit 
C) before him, Madsen was perfectly Justified in buying the 
property as was the Mill Fork Coal Company in taking a 
mortgage. 
POINT IV 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE FERRELLS-
HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE OF EXHIBIT D UNTIL AFTER 
THEY HAD PURCHASED THE PROPERTY IN RELIANCE 
UPON PARAGRAPH NO. 9 OF THEIR. CONTRACT 
' EXHIBIT C,. AND THE MOYLE LETTER, EXHIBIT 8. 
By the contract, Exhibit C, paragraph · 9, the plaintiffs 
agreed that: 
( ]n the event there are any .liens or encumbrances 
against said premises other than those herein provided 
for or referred to, or in the event any liens or encum-
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brances other than herein provided for shall hereafter 
accrue against the same by acts or neglect of the Sellers, 
then the Buyers may at their option, pay and discharge 
the same and receive credit on the amount then re-
tnaining due hereunder in the amount of any such 
payment or payments and thereafter the payments 
herein provided to be made may, at the option of the 
Buyers, be suspended until such a tin1e as such sus-
pended payments shall equal any sums advanced as 
aforesaid." · 
And the Moyle letter is as follows: (Exhibit 8) 
((You refer to the fact that Dr. Mathis does not ap-
pear of record to be the owner of the property. I have 
personally investigated this matter, and find that Dr. 
Mathis has a Contract for the purchase of the prop-
erty and I suggest that the payment of the balance of 
the down payment be made only upon condition that 
at the time of payment Dr. Mathis receive a proper 
deed for the property. I will personally see that a 
proper conveyance is obtained before or at at the 
time the payment is m:ade." 
As above observed there is no evidence whatsoever that 
Ferrell, at that time, had knowledge of Exhibit D .. He knew 
of the outstanding one-fifth interest in the Co-Op, and that 
is the interest ·which Moyles, by their letter, personally guar-
anteed to procure by legal conveyance before releasing th~ 
$30,000.00 which he paid for the p~operty. He was dealing 
with lawyers of good standing, he trusted them and trusted 
Mathis. H~ had a right to do so. Even had he known of the 
existence of Exhibit D," he still would have been justified in 
paying his money for it was paid upon the express condition 
that it should not be turned over to Mathis until a proper con-
veyance of the property was made. Such a conveyance was 
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not procured, and hence the trouble. Notice of existence of 
Exhibit D is wholly immaterial because Ferrells had protected 
themselves as against such contingency, both by the letter 
and by the contract. In the confusion resulting from the breech 
of good faith, as indicated, the title of the property was hope-
lessly involved and the stipulation furnished the only way 
out. It protects the rights of all parties. Before the Madsen 
interest could be eliminated, it was necessary for Ferrell to 
make an arrangement with him, which he did, as shown by 
the evidence, by agreeing to pay Madsen his proportionate 
part of the amount received from the sale of the property to the 
Sugar House Stake. The Western Reserve Underwriters Cor-
poration, as previously stated, refused to convey except in 
strict accordance with their contract, and the title therefore 
went four-fifths to ~athis and one-fifth to the Co-Op, which 
by the Warranty Deed to Mathis, passed to him and from 
him to Ferrell. 
From the sales of the property, $39,300.00 was deposited 
rn the Clearfield State Bank- in the joint names of Dan T. 
Moyle and J.-D. Skeen. The effect of the decision of the court, 
at this time, is to deprive Ferrell of his right to make applica-
tion of the money, which he received from the property to 
the extinguishment of the debt and Madsen's claim to the 
one-fifth interest. By the conflicting- findings of the court 
and the conclusion that the very instruments which must be 
construed to determine rights must be left for construction 
to another court. The court has deprived the Co-Op of' its 
interest in the fund. It has deprived Ferrell of ·his interest 
and Madsen of his interest, regardless ·of the interpretation 
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of the Exhibits E, R and 2 and the outcon1e of the suit now 
pending in Salt Lake County. Either the court spould have 
refused to try this case or it should have completed- the trial 
instead of attempting, by one isolated, unsupported and 
erroneous finding,. to· tie the hands of another court. 
POINT V 
TlfE COURT FAILED TO CONSTRUE OR TO GIVE 
EFFECT TO CONTRACTS FOR .THE OPERATION OF 
THE RANCH, EXHIBITS R, E AND 2. 
Exhibits R and E are simply memoranda of some sort 
of · a proposed working agreement for the operation· of the 
farm. In both agreements, Mathis is an active participant in 
the whole of the farm business. 
Exhibit 2 is a formal lease, complete in all respects and 
the court will find Mathis to be a lessor and a lessee. He ac-
tively participated in all ranch business after the date of the 
instrument. The Davis Cou~ty Cooperative Society ~as not. a 
lessee under the lease. After its execution, application was 
rn~de to the Production ·Credit Corporation for a loan of 
approximately $19,054.95. The money was received and ex-
pended by the lessees under Exhibit 2. 
Hansen, Frandsen and Owen were lessees and apparently 
lived on the property· and. ~ad to do with the business end 
of the operations. Subsequently, the ·same lessees borrowed 
$8,500.00 from the Lehi State Bank. The money was put in 
the name of Owen and paid out on his checks. Mathis par-
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ticipated in the management of the farm and in the conduct 
of its business. The court will find in a chattel and crop mort-
gage given by the lessees under the lease, Exhibit 2, that there 
was included all personal property on the ranch and also all 
crops. The celery crop complained of by Mathis was specifically 
described in the crop mortgage. A checking of the items speci-
fied in the particulars in the Salt Lake County suit in con-
nection with the items included in the Lehi State Bank mort-
gage wil~ disclose the participation of Mathis and also that 
the operations were conducted under the terms of the Lease, 
Exhibit 2. If losses were sustained, they were losses charge-. 
able to the lessees only and not to the Co-Op. The cross ex-
amination of Mathis clearly disclosed that he was not acting 
in good faith in wtihholding the money from the .Co-Op ev.en 
though Exhibit D were valid, but on the contrary, filed the 
suit for the purpose of intimidating the Co-Op, and as a pre-
tense for withholding from it its proportion of the money 
paid by Ferrell as the purchase price of the land . 
. POINT VI 
EXHIBIT D WAS NOT A TRANSFER OF THE IN-
TERESTS OF THE DAVIS COUNTY COOPERATIVE 
SOCIETY IN THE LANDS COVERED BY THE CON-
TRACT, EXHIBIT A. 
The court has treated Exhibit D as a valid transfer of the 
undivided one-fifth of the Saratoga Ranch to the plaintiffs. 
But for the stipulation, which is made without prejudice to 
either of the parties, to have accomplished . the purposes of 
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the court i~ cutting off the rights of the Co-Op, it would 
have been necessary ~qr the court to have .entered a Decree 
specifically performing the Contract, Exhibit D. We have set 
forth in detail the reasons why this could not have been done 
because Exhibit D was not a contract which would lend it-
self to specific performance. Accordingly, the court has taken 
the short cut predicated upon the stipulation which was to be 
without prejudice and has adjudged the money (the proceeds 
of the sale . of the property) to belong to the plaintiffs. It 
has done, indirectly and through the stipulation, what it could 
not have done in a direct suit for the specific performance 
of the memorandum. The defendants are entitled to protection 
under the stipulation. 
In order to bring about this result, a whole senes of 
errors was committed: 
l. The court disregarded the contract for the purchase 
of the land, Exhibit A. 
2. N othwithstanding the utter insufficiency of Exhibit 
D it proceeded to specifically enforce it. 
3. The court disregarded the Ferrell contract, Exhibit C. 
4. It imputed notice to Madsen because he attended a 
11?-eeting of a water company and was a brother-in-law of 
Ferrell. 
5. It nullified the deed to Madsen. 
6. It disregarded the non-acceptance of Exhibit D and 
its repudiation by the plaintiffs in withholding all of the 
money. 
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7. It has treated the instrument, which was not even 
intended as a conveyance or transfer of any interest. whatso-
ever to be a valid deed of conveyance. 
8. It disregarded the solemn agreement by the attorneys 
for the plaintiffs to procure a legal conveyance to Ferrell and 
9. The court has disregarded the solemn stip~lation of 
the parties that it was made without prejudice in order to 
clear the title to the land that it might be sold. 
POINT VII 
THE PLAINTIFFS REFUSED TO PAY TO THE 
DAVIS COUNTY COOPERATIVE SOCIETY ONE-FIFTH 
OF THE PROCEEDS OF THE SALE OF SAID PROPERTY· 
TO FERRELL AND THEREBY REJECTED THE BINDING 
EFF~CT, IF ANY, OF EXHIBIT D. 
The absolute and persistent .refusals on the part of 
Mathias to pay any part of the money received from the sale 
of the property to the Co-Op can be construed only as a rejec- ·· 
. tion of Exhibit D. It makes no difference whether that was a 
condition precedent or a condition subsequent. The fact that 
the plaintiffs resorted to a subterfuge to cheat the Co-Op out 
of its proportion of the money can be treated only as a rejection 
and repudiation of Exhibit D. There is no evidence that the 
Co-Op, as such, actually participated in the operation of the 
farm after Exhibit 2 was signed and the money was borrowed 
first frol!l the Production Credit Corporation and later from 
the Lehi State Bank. On the contrary, the lessees, borrowing 
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the money, complied with the rigid requirements of the Federal 
loan in the first instance, both in caring· for and in marketing 
the crops and ultimately in repaying the borrowed money, 
and it is perfectly evident that they likewise complied with 
the terms of the Chattel and Crop 1vfortgage given to the 
Lehi State Bank, during the time·. the lessees were borrowers 
from it. Such a large loan from a small town bank would 
have had rigid attention until it was paid. The fact that the 
obligation was met impels the conclusion that the lessees 
under Exhibit 2 complied with their obligation. One of the 
principal complaints made by Mathias was ·that too much .. 
celery was planted. Even so, it was Mathias who signed the 
crop mortgage which covered the acreage of celery, which 
he said was excessive. 
POINT VIII 
THE TRIAL OF THIS CASE WAS ABORTIVE AND 
INCOMPLETE AND INCONCLUSIVE IN THAT WHILE 
THE COURT BASED ITS JUDGMENT UPON THE POS-
SESSION BY THE DAVIS COUNTY . CO-OP OF THE 
SARATOGA RANCH, IT REFUSED TO CONSIDER THE · 
INSTRUMENTS WHICH SHOW CONCLUSIVELY THAT 
THE LEGAL AND ACTUAL POSSESSION OF THE PROP-
ERTY WAS IN THE PLAINTlFF AND OTHER INDIVI-
DUALS, NOT INCLUDING THEDA VIS COUNTY CO-OP. 
The most serious criticism of the findings and conclusions 
is that the court went out of its way to cover up a res judicata 
which may have the effect of staying the hand of the District 
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Court for Salt Lake County in the pending case. We have said 
all that \Ye should say with respect to the grievous errors 
of the court in finding that the Davis County Cooperative 
Society was in charge of the ranching operations in the face 
of the conclusive documentary evidence to the contrary. While 
the court left the construction of the Exhibits R, E and 2 to 
the Salt Lake Court, the construction, regardless of the views 
of the Salt Lake Court, may serve no purpose if the finding 
and conclusion that the Co-Op was in possession of the prop-
erty stands. As to whether the finding and conclusion actually 
constitute a res judicata would be a legal question and another 
lawsuit which we hope to avoid. If this. judgment stands, the 
Salt Lake Court may be left the one function of· balancing 
the accounts involving the qperation of the farm under Ex-
hibit 2. But the court will have, by this Judgment, given effect 
to Exhibit D and will have cut off completely the meritorious 
claims of both Madsen and Ferrell and would have jeopard-
ized the position of the Co-Op. In addition to what we have 
heretofore said, we call atten~ion to the fact that the Co-Op 
is a corporation with stockholders and capital and the indivi-
duals named in Exhibit 2 were simply stockholders of the 
corporation. ·Without any contention having been made in 
the pleadings, the evidence, briefs, arguments or otherwise 
that the individuals were acting for the Co-Op and not for 
themselves, the court disregards the corporate entity and holds 
the corporation liable for obligations, if any; of three of its 
stockholders, who acted for themselves and not" otherwise. 
It would serve no purpose to pursue this argument further 
upon this point. 
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POINT IX 
THE DECREE MADE 'AND GIVEN IN THE ABOVE-
ENTITLED CAUSE IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FIND-
INGS OR CONCLUSIONS OR THE RECORD, IS UNJUST 
AND CONTRARY TO LAW AND EQUITY, AND.THE 
JUDG~ENT MUST BE REVERSED. 
· Under no theory of law or equity can this judgment be 
sustained. If not set aside, . extended expensive litigation is 
bound to follow because the Utah County Court has invaded 
the jurisdiction of the Salt Lake County Court, and without 
issues, evidence or reason may have barred the just and equit-
able disposition of the controversies among the parties hereto. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J.D. SKEEN, 
Attorney for Appellants 
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